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The Declining Representativeness of the British
Party System, and Why It Matters
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University of Essex
In a recent article, Michael Laver has explained ‘Why Vote-Seeking Parties May Make Voters Miserable’. His model
shows that, while ideological convergence may boost congruence between governments and the median voter, it can
reduce congruence between the party system and the electorate as a whole. Specifically, convergence can increase the
mean distance between voters and their nearest party. In this article we show that this captures the reality of today’s
British party system. Policy scale placements in British Election Studies from 1987 to 2010 confirm that the
pronounced convergence during the past decade has left the Conservatives and Labour closer together than would be
optimal in terms of minimising the policy distance between the average voter and the nearest major party.We go on
to demonstrate that this comes at a cost. Respondents who perceive themselves as further away from one of the major
parties in the system tend to score lower on satisfaction with democracy. In short, vote-seeking parties have left the
British party system less representative of the ideological diversity in the electorate, and thus made at least some British
voters miserable.
Keywords: representation; policy convergence; British politics; satisfaction with
democracy
Crisis might be overstating the point, but party politics in Britain is not in rude health.
Fewer voters report a feeling of attachment to a political party, and the proportion reporting
strong attachments has declined especially sharply (Denver et al., 2012, pp. 70–1). Despite
an electoral system strongly discouraging votes for parties other than the Conservatives and
Labour, the proportion of votes won by those parties has fallen from over 90 per cent in the
1960s to less than 70 per cent in recent elections (Denver et al., 2012, p. 2). When the
precipitous decline in turnout is taken into account, the electoral hold of these parties looks
even shakier. Recent British Election Studies (BES) also show that feeling thermometer
ratings for the Conservatives and Labour show a noticeable cooling trend, and that general
evaluations of political parties and elections are not complimentary (Clarke et al., 2004, pp.
290–1; 2009, ch. 8).The competition between the major parties at election time leaves a
growing proportion of citizens unimpressed.
In this article we suggest that one reason is an increasingly unrepresentative party system.
Ideological convergence not only leaves the major British parties less distinct and thus
narrows choice; it can also leave the average voter further in terms of ideological distance
from the nearest party with a realistic chance of governing.That variable – distance from the
nearest major party – is at the heart of this article.We argue that it provides an additional
yardstick of representation, beyond the usual concern with congruence between govern-
ment and the median voter. Further, it has the potential to shape broader system orienta-
tions. Independent of election outcomes and government performance, voters may derive
satisfaction with democracy from a sense that their opinions are at least represented by a
contender for office.
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Both the theoretical and empirical sections fall into two main parts. First, we consider
how the British party system should be structured in order to maximise representation of
the ideological dispersion in the electorate. Put another way: what configuration of the two
major parties would minimise the average distance between voters and their nearest major
party?1 Second, we consider the extent to which this matters in terms of citizens’ satisfac-
tion with democracy.We show that the dramatic convergence of recent years has left many
voters ‘ideologically disenfranchised’ – that is, a long distance from their nearest significant
party – and that this has indeed taken a toll on democratic satisfaction.While our empirical
focus is on Britain, there are grounds for expecting similar findings wherever the major
contenders, in their pursuit of the median voter, have left a party system that neglects
ideological diversity among voters.
Representation, Parties and Party Systems
The concept of representation is at the heart of electoral politics (Pitkin, 1972). Yet it
remains contested in important respects. Outside the focus on descriptive representation,
concerning the extent to which different segments of society, such as women and ethnic
or linguistic minorities, are given a voice or a presence in parliaments (e.g. Banducci et al.,
2004; Celis and Childs, 2008; Pitkin, 1972, ch. 4), the emphasis of electoral researchers is
largely on substantive or policy representation. Although this stems from empirical analy-
ses of issue voting, the concern is largely a normative one, namely the extent to which
parties or governments manage to represent or respond to the policy preferences of voters
(Adams and Merrill, 1999; Blais and Bodet, 2006; Huber and Powell, 1994; Miller and
Stokes, 1963; Powell, 2004; Schmitt and Thomassen, 1999). Almost invariably, scholars
have assessed dyadic relationships: between candidates and their electoral districts (Miller
and Stokes, 1963), between voters and parties (Schmitt and Thomassen, 1999) or between
governments and the electorate (Huber and Powell, 1994).The latter investigates whether
governments enact the popular will – and how well institutional arrangements ensure as
much.
In those models, the popular will is typically represented by the median voter. As Matt
Golder and Jacek Stramski (2010, p. 90) summarise,‘the predominant way to conceptualize
and measure citizen–representative congruence is in terms of the absolute ideological
distance between the median citizen and the government’. Representation is thus under-
stood in terms of what those authors call ‘absolute median citizen congruence’.
The logic underlying these models is clear and G. Bingham Powell concludes that
‘[t]he appropriate normative standard for the congruence of citizens and policymakers is the
position of the median citizen’ (Powell, 2000, p. 164). But there are limitations to the
‘commonality’ approach of focusing on governments and the mean or median voter. It
neglects all information about the distribution of citizen preferences – that is, about
whether and how opinions vary. As such, it implies consensus, downplays ideological
divisions and thus gives an incomplete account of the representative capacity of political
parties. While parties are widely acknowledged as the crucial linkage between public
preferences and policy making, most clearly so in the ‘responsible party’ model of repre-
sentation (Miller and Stokes, 1963; Powell, 2004; Schmitt and Thomassen, 1999), the focus
remains on governments. It is by gaining office and enacting their programmes that parties
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are held to represent their voters. The notion that parties might fulfil representative
functions while in opposition is largely ignored.
Where studies have assessed the representativeness of political parties, as opposed to
governing parties or coalitions, the concern has generally been with the dyadic relationship
– specifically the policy congruence – between parties and their voters (e.g. Adams and
Merrill, 1999; Dalton, 1985; Miller et al., 1999; Wessels, 2011). However, alongside this
dyadic approach to representation, an ‘equally valid tradition exists that views representation
in terms of institutions collectively representing a people’ (Weissberg, 1978, p. 535).This
tradition has long historical roots and can be traced back to political philosophers like J. S.
Mill (see Golder and Stramski, 2010, pp. 95ff.) Collective representation received further
theoretical consideration by Jane Mansbridge, for whom what she labelled ‘surrogate
representation thus focuses not on the dyadic relation between representative and constitu-
ent but on the system-wide composition of the legislature ... and shifts normative scrutiny
from constituent-oriented accountability to systemic inequities in representation’
(Mansbridge, 2003, p. 524).
This highlights two alternative and potentially contrary normative aspirations: ‘one-to-
many’ representation which embodies conventional analysis of congruence between gov-
ernments and citizens (or the responsible party dyad between parties or candidates and their
respective voters), and ‘many-to-many’ representation which captures ‘the ideal of having a
legislature that accurately reflects the ideological preferences of the citizenry as a whole’
(Golder and Stramski, 2010, p. 91). In the context of political parties, the second aspiration
calls for attention not only to the representativeness of individual parties – in or out of
government – but also to the representativeness of the overall party system.
The core difficulty in conceptualising many-to-many representation, or the representa-
tiveness of party systems, lies in the fact that voters are continuously distributed – whether
normally or otherwise – across the entire ideological spectrum, whereas parties are few and
(sometimes) far between.The task is therefore to establish how the distribution of a small
number of parties – maybe only two and never more than single figures if we consider only
pivotal parties – matches with the continuous distribution of an entire society. Golder and
Stramski (2010, pp. 96ff.) deal with this by means of cumulative distribution functions
(CDFs) for both citizens and party systems, and then measuring how much the area
between the two CDFs differs from zero. However, this does artificially convert a highly
discontinuous small-N distribution of parties into a continuous distribution, weighted by
party size.
We argue that this can be avoided by a much simpler means of conceptualising and,
ultimately, operationalising party system representativeness. Basically, for any number of
parties and any continuous distribution of citizens along an ideological or policy dimen-
sion, those parties can be arranged along that dimension so that the mean distance of a citizen
from his or her nearest party is minimised. As a simple example, imagine six voters being
uniformly distributed along a six-point policy dimension: that is, one located at each of the
six points. If there are two parties, party system representativeness would be maximised with
the two parties at points 2 and 5. No voter would be more than one point away from a
party, and the total sum – and thus the mean – of voter–party distances is minimised.Thus,
while party system representativeness is an aggregate-level concept, on this reading it is
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operationalised via an individual-level indicator: the average distance of a citizen from his
or her nearest party.
As that simple example highlights, the maximally representative party system may be
quite different from any Downsian competitive equilibrium. That is the crux of our
argument: that competition for votes does not necessarily preserve the normative ideal in
terms of party system representativeness.Were the two parties to move to points 3 and 4 in
the spectrum, the mean distance-to-nearest-party among voters at points 2–5 would be
unchanged but the two voters at the extreme points would see their policy representation
reduced.
Studies of party systems have rarely focused on their representative properties, let alone
the version of representativeness outlined just above.Two exceptions, the studies by Gary
Cox (1990) and André Blais and Marc Bodet (2006), show that proportional representation
– especially in its more permissive forms – encourages not only a larger number but also
a more ideologically diverse range of parties.Golder and Stramski (2010) take these analyses
a stage further by distinguishing the two forms of congruence contrasted earlier. They
show that, while proportional representation fails to improve absolute or relative congru-
ence between governments and the citizenry, it does generate greater congruence between
legislatures and voters. Using Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) data, they
show a negative relationship between Michael Gallagher’s (1991) measure of dispropor-
tionality and the degree of identity between voter and legislator distributions in a one-
dimensional left–right policy space (Golder and Stramski, 2010, pp. 101–5).2
While Golder and Stramski’s operationalisation of party system representativeness differs
somewhat from ours, the two have enough in common that we would expect a similar
pattern: that is, proportional representation would tend to reduce the mean distance
between voters and their nearest party. This has clear implications for the British case.
Whether or not the strongly majoritarian system results in governments that represent the
median voter’s policy preferences, it is unlikely to foster a party system representing the
diverse preferences within the electorate.The incentives for parties to converge ideologi-
cally under such arrangements were famously set out by Anthony Downs (1957), as are the
centrifugal incentives operating in proportional systems (Cox, 1990). However, the con-
sequences of Downsian spatial logic for representation – in particular, collective represen-
tation by parties – have been less thoroughly rehearsed.We address this in the next section,
paying close attention to the microeconomic underpinnings of the Downsian model and
their welfare implications.
Ideological Convergence and the Representativeness of
the Party System
The Downsian spatial model was derived from Harold Hotelling’s (1929) one-dimensional
model of economic competition. Hotelling’s starting point was the tendency for markets to
deviate from perfect competition in the direction of oligopoly or monopoly.That raises the
question of how these few larger firms compete with one another. Hotelling’s core
conclusion – that firms will tend to cluster together – is perhaps better remembered than
his subsidiary point, that such clustering is socially inefficient.The socially optimal positioning
of sellers, namely that which minimises the transportation charges paid by all customers
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overall, is unachievable under capitalism – this is ‘the wastefulness of private profit-seeking
management’ (Hotelling, 1929,pp.53–4).While individual sellers choose profit-maximising
locations, the average customer has to travel further than if those sellers were more dispersed
along Main Street.
While Hotelling’s main focus was on transportation costs, his model can be generalised
beyond physical distances to other differences between products: that is, to other sources of
horizontal differentiation. Horizontally differentiated products vary on some key dimension,
such as the sweetness of cider, along which public tastes also vary. As a result, different
customers prefer different products (Lancaster, 1975; Shaked and Sutton, 1987). The
contrast is with vertically differentiated products, which vary only in characteristics like
freshness that are uniformly appreciated by consumers.Preferences here are uniform in that,
with prices held equal, all customers prefer the same cider (Constantatos and Perrakis, 1997;
Wauthy, 1996). Hotelling shows that the products of profit-seeking firms will be less
horizontally differentiated on any dimension than is socially optimal given the breadth of
public tastes.
Subsequent economic literature refines this conclusion, identifying different styles of
imperfect competition with different patterns of product differentiation. Under monopo-
listic competition, individual sellers control one particular segment of the market, cater only
for the tastes of that segment, and thus are unlikely either greatly to expand their market
share or to lose much of it at the margins. Such competition actually leads to too much
differentiation in terms of the distance – however measured – between consumers and their
nearest product (Lancaster, 1975, p. 585). The contrasting result outlined by Hotelling
emerges when sellers adopt expansionist strategies, seeking to monopolise the sector.This
requires firms to cater to common preferences across the market rather than to the tastes
of different segments, and the outcome is too little horizontal product differentiation
(Constantatos and Perrakis, 1997). It is well known that successful monopolists can hold
output below and prices above the welfare-maximising points; the point here is that
competition for monopoly also reduces welfare by narrowing the range of products
available to consumers (Marris and Mueller, 1980, p. 50).
As noted earlier, this economic reasoning is familiar to political scientists through the
Downsian spatial model, but its welfarist implications may be less familiar.The latter have
been the focus of recent work by Michael Laver and Ernest Sergenti (2012; see also Laver,
2011). They depart from the simple normative assumption that a socially optimal repre-
sentative system is one that minimises the sum of all policy distances between each voter
and his or her closest party. Perfect representativeness (summed policy distances of zero)
would only be achieved ‘if there is a party with a policy position at the ideal point of each
voter’ (Laver, 2011, p. 494). This is neither achievable nor desirable: electoral markets no
more approximate perfect competition than do economic markets, and in any case such
fragmentation would inhibit governance. But it provides a meaningful ultimate standard, a
social welfare function, against which the representativeness of party systems – modelled or
real – can be judged.And it is the basis for our definition of that representativeness as the
average distance between a voter and his or her nearest major party.
Laver and Sergenti (2012) go on to set out the different competitive strategies open to
political parties, depending on political goals, and estimate the impact of these strategies on
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the representativeness of legislatures.They distinguish three decision rules or types of party:
‘stickers’, which never change policy position; ‘hunters’, which are vote seeking and
reposition opportunistically; and ‘aggregators’, which move only along with their existing
support, trying to capture the ideal policy positions of current supporters rather than trying
to attract new followers. Modelling the consequences of such decision rules, Laver and
Sergenti (2012) and Laver (2011) find that any vote-seeking strategy results in suboptimal
representation. The more vote-seeking parties that operate in a party system, the less
differentiated their ideological products, and the less representative is the party system. It is
aggregators, those parties that focus on representing their current supporters, which help
increase representativeness of legislatures. Just as its economic equivalent emerges in
monopolistic competition with a segmented market, so the closest approximations to the
ideal-type aggregator are traditional parties in cleavage-based systems of segmented repre-
sentation. It is therefore easy to see why the well-documented transition of many such
parties into ‘catch-all’ parties (Kirchheimer, 1966) – a change from monopolistic compe-
tition between aggregators to competition for monopoly between hunters – will have
weakened representativeness over time, and thus reduced social welfare.3
A final stage in Laver’s (2011) work is also important for present purposes. Since
transportation charges accruing from distance from the nearest seller are the market
equivalent of distances of voters from the nearest party in the policy space, Hotelling’s
model pointed towards the socially ideal positioning of parties in a two-party system.And
Laver calculates that, assuming a normal distribution of voter preferences, optimal repre-
sentation would result from parties located ‘at about -0.8 and +0.8 standard deviations from
the mean voter ideal point’ (Laver, 2011, p. 494).We explore such calculations further in this
article, based on the actual distribution of British voters.
Consequences of an Unrepresentative Party System
The title of Laver’s (2011) article, ‘WhyVote-Seeking Parties May MakeVoters Miserable’,
makes explicit one of the core hypotheses of this article: that the unrepresentativeness of a
party system resulting from ideological convergence carries a cost in terms of citizen
satisfaction with electoral democracy. There is suggestive evidence in support of this
argument from Harold Clarke et al. (2009, pp. 300–2), whose model of democratic satis-
faction included linear and quadratic terms for left–right self-placement.They found clear
curvilinearity, with satisfaction highest among those placing themselves towards the centre
of the scale. This is consistent with the claim that dissatisfaction is triggered partly by
convergence. However, this analysis considered only self-placements, whereas our central
arguments concern the relationships between voters and the party system.
A recent study by Lawrence Ezrow and Georgios Xezonakis (2011), based on twelve
European countries over the period 1976–2003, undermines the notion that vote-seeking
parties make voters miserable.They calculate how far in left–right terms the average party
position falls from the mean voter (using Comparative Manifestos Project data for the
parties and the Eurobarometer’s left–right scale for voters). The core finding from their
longitudinal analysis is that, as the average party moves closer to the mean voter, satisfaction
with democracy increases.This is aggregate-level evidence and, as such, does not directly
address our research questions about how an individual’s perceptions of representational
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distances will affect his or her satisfaction with democracy. Nonetheless, since the thrust of
our argument is at odds with Ezrow and Xezonakis’ (2011,p. 1171) conclusion that ‘citizens
are more content with convergent outcomes than with divergent ones’, it is worth
considering why we suspect that ideological convergence might erode satisfaction.After all,
at least on a narrow conception of rationality, voters will rationally be concerned only with
policy outputs and, as such, only with the representativeness of governing parties as in the
standard models.
Our core argument is about voters deriving democratic satisfaction from finding some
close representation of their policy preferences in parliament, whether from the opposition
or the governing party. A closely related notion is encapsulated in the CSES question
‘Would you say that any of the parties in [country] represent your views reasonably well?’4
We might reasonably expect those answering ‘yes’ to this question to show greater satis-
faction with democracy (to some extent independently of whether the party in question
reaches power). Conversely, a feeling that even the nearest party is far distant is likely to
weaken any sense of electoral efficacy, and indeed Bernhard Wessels (2011, p. 106) finds that
those answering ‘no’ were much less likely to endorse the capacity of elections to represent
citizens’ views.There is a parallel here with party identification. Partisanship is positively
associated with satisfaction with electoral democracy, again independently of whether the
party gains office (Clarke et al., 2004, p. 306). Attachment to the system is fostered by a
feeling, not necessarily instrumental, of connection to one of the key players. Party
identification is probably stronger glue than spatial representation but, for the growing
number of voters with little or no partisan attachment, the next best thing might be to feel
that at least one of the parties shares their policy outlook.As we will show in the first step
of our analysis, such proximity between individual voters and parties is maximised by a
diverse party system, and becomes eroded under policy convergence.
The main argument, then, does not require voters to value a diverse party system as such.
Party system diversity matters because, even if ideologically diverse citizens care only about
proximity to their own nearest party, this proximity at the individual level can only be
accomplished through policy divergence at system level. However, it is at least worth
considering whether voters place a value directly on party system diversity. Economists
show that merely having choices carries intrinsic satisfactions (Langer and Rodin, 1976;
Ryan and Deci, 2000).5 Applying this to electoral politics, we might expect any given
voter’s appreciation of a party system to depend in part on its ideological diversity. Yet
there is a caveat that applies in the electoral context, since voters often end up ‘consuming’
the products of a party that they did not choose. Being on the losing side in elections is
known to dampen satisfaction with democracy, especially in majoritarian systems where the
unwanted winner can govern alone (Anderson and Guillory, 1997; Blais and Gélineau,
2007).That effect seems likely to be stronger if the defeat ushers in an ideologically distant
party.Whether the benefits of choice outweigh the risks is an empirical question that we
address in this article. Ezrow and Xezonakis’ (2011) results suggest that they do not: it was
convergence, which narrows choice but also reduces risk, that was associated with greater
democratic satisfaction.
That final point recalls the more restrictive account of representation with which we
started. More representative party systems might be thought to come at a cost in terms
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of congruence between governments and the median voter. However, any apparent
tension between the two forms of representation is eased if elections are considered as a
continuous process rather than individually. Over time, congruence between government
and the larger public can be accomplished by alternation of left-of-centre and right-of-
centre governments. As James Stimson (1991) and Christopher Wlezien (1995) show,
electorates respond systematically to non-centrist policies by developing demand for the
opposing view, which can result in a broadly symmetrical oscillation of administrations
around the median position. Given the potential benefits of feeling represented and
perceiving choice, achieving congruence through alternation may well do more for sat-
isfaction than the alternative in which governing parties continuously take centrist posi-
tions. Electoral competition in such a party system, where the main parties have
converged such that vertical differentiation is the only basis for choice, is known as
valence politics (Stokes, 1963; 1992; see also Green, 2007). In the concluding section, we
consider the extent to which valence competition can generate satisfaction even in an
unrepresentative party system.
Hypotheses, Data and Measures
Our empirical analysis falls into two parts. First, we assess the representativeness of the
British party system over the past six elections. These represent a period (from 1987 to
2010) during which both major parties have been widely seen – by commentators, by those
measuring party placements via manifestos (Bara, 2010) and, as we shall see, by voters – as
converging ideologically to the point where little difference remains between them. In
Laver and Sergenti’s (2012) terms, both parties resembled ‘aggregators’ in the 1980s while
both moved towards the ‘hunter’ type throughout the 1990s and 2000s. As James Adams
et al. (2011) show, this dramatic depolarisation among the parties has been accompanied by
only modest convergence among voters.We therefore hypothesise:
H1.The perceived gap between the major parties is narrower than the optimal gap.
This amounts to an empirical test of the computational models in Laver (2011) and Laver
and Sergenti (2012), measuring how far from the optimum the British party system actually
falls. If this hypothesis is confirmed, then the mean distance to a voter’s nearest party would
be reduced if the parties moved apart.
This hypothesis is tested on BES data from those six elections. For the longitudinal
analysis, representational distances are calculated using self- and party placements on an
eleven-point policy scale. Respondents were asked:‘Using the 0 to 10 scale, where 0 means
government should cut taxes and spend much less on health and social services, and 10 means
government should raise taxes a lot and spend much more on health and social services, where would
you place yourself/the parties?’ (Only respondents who placed themselves and both major
parties on the scale were retained in the analyses.)6 We reverse code the scale so that, when
the data are graphed, the left-wing position appears on the left. We were unable to use
left–right placement scales for the longitudinal analysis because these were omitted from the
earlier BES in the sequence.However, the tax–spending scale does capture a core dimension
of left–right and it bears on a number of issues that were routinely salient in the elections
covered.
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The second stage of analysis is to test whether the hypothesised deficit in representation
matters. Our primary concern is whether the closer voters perceive themselves to one of
the major parties in the system the more satisfied they are with democracy (H2). Of
secondary concern but also worth testing is the more speculative suggestion that those
perceiving a wider gap between the major parties – and, thus, a broader ideological choice
– will be more satisfied. However, our earlier arguments about monopolistic competition,
along with the possibility that voters anticipate the cost of major policy reversals, suggest a
turning point at which more choice no longer adds to and may even detract from
satisfaction.We therefore posit and test a curvilinear hypothesis: satisfaction is greater when
parties are perceived as further apart (H3a) but only up to a point (H3b).
H2. Perceived distance from the nearest major party is negatively associated with satisfaction
with democracy.
H3a. Perceived distance between the two major parties is positively associated with satisfaction
with democracy.
H3b.The square of perceived distance between the two major parties is negatively associated
with satisfaction with democracy.
Satisfaction with democracy is measured on the standard four-point scale from ‘very
satisfied’ to ‘not at all satisfied’. Since this item is unavailable in some of the BES in our
sequence,7 H2 and H3 are tested using the 2005 study. Since that survey also included
left–right self- and party placements, we can test our core individual-level hypotheses
using the ideological scale as well as the tax–spend policy dimension. In addition, the
2005 survey offers plentiful controls for multivariate modelling of democratic satisfaction.
Controlling for other factors that are known to influence democratic satisfaction, and
which may generate a spurious association between satisfaction and perceived ideological
distances, is essential if we are to draw any causal inference about the relationship between
our two key variables. All of the variables are taken from the pre-election wave of the
2005 BES.
Results
The top rows of Table 1 contain basic descriptive statistics for voter and party placements
on the tax-spend scale.The mean voter has throughout this period been to the left of the
midpoint of 5, indicating a general preference for increased spending on public services.8
However, the mean has shifted in what look like the thermostatic responses to policy
anticipated by Wlezien (1995).The leftmost mean is seen in 1997 after a long period of
Conservative government in which public services were seen as having been neglected; the
rightmost mean is seen in 2010, during a campaign dominated by the issue of public debt.
Of more direct concern here are the standard deviations which give a simple indication of
ideological dispersion in the electorate.They echo the findings of Adams et al. (2011) that
there has been only modest convergence among voters. This contrasts sharply with the
next row of data which confirms that the two major parties are seen as having converged
almost to the point of superimposition. Placed on average more than four scale points
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apart at the start of this period, they were barely distinguished by respondents in the 2010
BES.
The data in the lower half of the table address H1 and the broader question of how
representative the British party system has been in terms of ideological dispersion over this
period. For each election, and based on that year’s actual distribution of voters in tax–spend
policy space, we calculate a series of hypothetical mean distances between a voter and his
or her nearest major party. Each mean distance is based on a scenario in which the two
major parties are split symmetrically around the mean voter position on the tax–spend
scale.9 So, for example, the figure in the bottom left corner of the table indicates that, in
1987, the voters would, on average, have fallen 1.12 points from the nearest main party had
the parties been located at 1.47 and 5.47 – that is, four points apart and two points either
side of the mean voter position of 3.47. Our concern is with the hypothetical gap between
the parties that would minimise that mean distance. Since the precise gap will depend not
only on the exact standard deviation but also other idiosyncrasies of that year’s distribution,
we do not simulate every possible distance between the parties but instead use half-point
intervals to give a broad idea of the optimal gap between the parties. For each election, that
optimal gap is highlighted in the table.10
At the beginning of the series, the contending parties were too far apart for an optimally
representative party system.This is clearest in 1987 when they were perceived as more than
four points apart while mean distance would have been minimised by a gap of around three.
The polarisation of that period corresponds to the monopolistic competition between
‘aggregators’ (or perhaps even ‘stickers’) which leads to an over-differentiated market.This
was corrected by the perceived narrowing of the Labour–Conservative gap by 1997; since
then, the acceleration of convergence has opened up a representational deficit in the other
direction. In 2005 and 2010, mean distance would have been minimised had the gap been
around a point and a half wider. If anything, then,H1 risks understatement: the parties could
have returned to 1980s levels of polarisation and this would only have improved the overall
representativeness of the party system. Competition for monopoly by ‘hunters’ has created
under-differentiation more acute than the over-differentiation of the early elections in our
series.
Based on a normal distribution of voter positions,Laver (2011) estimated that the optimal
party placements would be around 0.8 standard deviations from the mean voter. Since the
actual distributions of voter positions are neither normal nor constant, our empirical
estimations are rougher and more contingent. But we can say that, in all six elections, the
optimal gap was at least slightly narrower than0.8 standard deviations, although it did not
narrow beyond0.6 until the 2010 election. Since our upcoming analyses are based on the
2005 BES, we use that election to illustrate the calculation and the key findings so far.With
a standard deviation of voter positions of around 2, and an optimal inter-party gap of 2.5
(i.e. 1.25 points either side of the mean), the optimal placements of the parties are at about
0.6 (1.25/2) standard deviations.The reason why this gap is narrower than Laver’s 0.8
is the combination of skewness and leptokurtosis illustrated in Figure 1, which shows the
2005 distribution of voters on the tax–spend scale around their mean position of 3.84.11 It
also shows the mean placements of the two major parties.The clustering of the three solid
lines – all within around one scale point – shows how closely the parties fall both to one
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another and (especially with Labour) to the average voter.This clustering can easily distract
attention from the rest of the graph. While the mean voter is spoiled for choice,
plenty of voters on both sides of the distribution fall a long way from the representational
‘action’.A broader conception thus gives a less optimistic estimate of representation. Both
parties fall some way within the dashed lines, which denote the party positions that would
maximise representation according to the ‘mean distance from the nearest major party’
yardstick.
The results so far confirm that, in recent British elections, many voters have been faced
with two options for government that are rather remote as well as hard to distinguish
ideologically.The next task is to assess whether this matters for democratic satisfaction and
other indicators of attachment to electoral democracy.We begin with two ordered logistic
regression models of satisfaction with democracy in the 2005 BES. Our main predictors of
interest are the distances measuring the representativeness of the party system: to the nearest
major party and between the two major parties.The two models reflect alternative bases for
calculating representational distances: the tax–spend scale analysed so far; and the left–right
scale unavailable in earlier BES but included in the 2005 survey. Guided by previous
analyses, we also control for party identification, political and social trust, economic
evaluations, political interest and efficacy, and socio-demographic variables (Anderson and
Tverdova, 2001; Clarke et al., 2004, ch. 9; Zmerli and Newton, 2008).12 The results are
reported in Table 2.
Figure 1: Comparing Mean Party Placements with Representation-Maximising Party
Positions Given Voter Distribution on Tax–Spend Scale, 2005
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Increase Cut
Position on tax-spend scale
Mean Con 
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Sources: BES 2005 (Pre-election face-to-face survey); authors’ calculations.
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Looking first at the left–right results, we find clear support for H2 but none for either
element of H3. Holding constant a wide range of other indicators of system attachment, we
find that a voter’s left–right distance from his or her nearest major party has a significant
negative effect on his or her reported satisfaction with democracy.However, echoing Ezrow
and Xezonakis’ (2011) finding, ideological convergence does not trigger dissatisfaction by
narrowing voters’ choices. Perceptions of the ideological distance between the two major
parties were not associated with democratic satisfaction.The representational shortfall has to
do with individuals’ demands for policy proximity rather than their preferences for how the
party system should be structured.Whether or not parties are too close to each other, they
are too far from many of their voters.
H2 is just as resoundingly confirmed in the analysis based on tax–spend policy distance.
Again, distance from the nearest party was significantly and negatively associated with
satisfaction. Since we have already seen that the parties have converged so as to increase this
Table 2: Ordered Logistic Regression Models of Democratic Satisfaction
Left–right distances Tax–spend distances
B s.e. B s.e.
Distance to nearest party -0.13*** 0.04 -0.11*** 0.03
Perceived Lab–Con distance 0.02 0.03 -0.04 0.03
(Perceived Lab–Con distance)2 0.00 0.01 0.02** 0.01
Conservative ID 0.12 0.15 0.03 0.12
Labour ID 0.39*** 0.14 0.37*** 0.12
Other party ID -0.17 0.15 -0.14 0.12
Trust Westminster parliament 0.23*** 0.03 0.22*** 0.02
Trust politicians generally 0.10*** 0.03 0.08*** 0.03
Trust local MP to work hard 0.21*** 0.05 0.19*** 0.04
Attention to politics -0.06*** 0.02 -0.02 0.02
Influence on politics 0.08*** 0.02 0.08*** 0.02
Retrospective economic evaluations 0.33*** 0.05 0.39*** 0.05
Social trust 0.15*** 0.02 0.13*** 0.02
Age 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Female -0.05 0.09 -0.07 0.08
Ethnic minority -0.16 0.17 -0.06 0.15
Terminal education age -0.06** 0.03 -0.06** 0.03
(Threshold = 1) 0.81 0.33 0.89 0.26
(Threshold = 2) 2.97 0.33 3.05 0.27
(Threshold = 3) 6.67 0.36 6.90 0.30
Cox/Snell R2 0.24 0.24
N 2,101 2,811
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
Source: BES 2005 (pre-election face-to-face survey).
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average distance, Laver’s fear that vote-seeking parties may make voters miserable is thus
realised empirically. However, the null findings in terms of Labour–Conservative distance
are not fully replicated.The quadratic term for this inter-party distance is significant and,
contrary to the prediction in H3b, it is positive. And the linear term, though not quite
significant, is negative and thus also takes the opposite form from that hypothesised. It
seems that, at least on this policy dimension, voters would like the parties to be either
very close or very distant. In order to shed some more light on this surprising finding,
we re-ran the models separately for subgroups distinguished by their party identification.
The results are reported in Appendix Table A1.They show that the positive effect of the
quadratic term for intra-party distance proved significant only for supporters of ‘other
parties’.A speculative suggestion is that this group includes supporters both of the Liberal
Democrats, who prefer parties to hug their own centrist position, and of the smaller and
typically more distinctively left- or right-wing parties who would prefer a clearer ideo-
logical choice.13
The task now is to assess the size of the nearest-party effect that was consistent and
significant in both regressions. Effect size can be assessed in absolute and relative terms. For
the former, we used the left–right distance regression to calculate predicted probabilities of
being in each category of democratic satisfaction, and to see how these vary by distance. Of
those placing themselves in the same left–right position as their nearest party, 64 per cent
are predicted to fall into the ‘fairly satisfied’ category, and the probability of being ‘very
satisfied’ (8 per cent) is greater than that of being ‘very dissatisfied’ (6 per cent).Among the
roughly one in eight respondents who fall three or more points from their nearest party, just
49 per cent were predicted to be ‘fairly satisfied’ and the ‘very satisfied’ (4 per cent) were
likely to be outnumbered by the ‘very dissatisfied’ (15 per cent). In so far as vote-seeking
parties have increased the proportion of the electorate falling such long distances from their
nearest major party, which is what our earlier longitudinal analysis suggests, then they have
indeed made some voters miserable.
Illustrating the relative effect size is complicated by the difficulty of comparing coeffi-
cients in logistic models.We therefore take advantage of the fact that ordinary least squares
(OLS) regressions with the same data yield virtually identical substantive conclusions (see
Appendix Table A2), and instead use standardised coefficients from those analyses as the
basis for comparison. The coefficients for variables significant in either the left–right or
the tax–spend analysis are shown in Figure 2.The graph shows some familiar results from
the literature on satisfaction with democracy: pronounced positive effects of political and
social trust, of supporting the governing party and of favourable economic evaluations.
Nonetheless, the coefficients for distance from nearest party are comparable in size to most
in the model (including those, such as for trust in politicians and political efficacy, which are
likelier to be inflated by endogeneity). In sum, and irrespective of the basis for calculating
distances, the effect of distance to nearest major party is not only statistically significant but
far from negligible in size.
While a causal effect of ideological distance can only be inferred, there are reasons for
confidence in such inference.The model is quite well specified14 and indeed includes some
variables, such as efficacy, that could well be causally posterior to perceptions of represen-
tation.The effect of distance to the nearest party on satisfaction was robust against different
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specifications; indeed, the results in Table 2 closely resemble the bivariate relationships
between these variables. Moreover, concerns about endogeneity are eased by the use of an
indirect measure of voter–party distance.A respondent already dissatisfied with democracy
might well answer ‘no’ to the CSES question about whether any of the available parties
represents their views. Yet our measure is based on separate placement questions, less
immediately connected to the dependent variable.
Conclusions
Towards the end of his landmark article, Hotelling remarks that the tendency to conver-
gence extends well beyond the economic markets that he has discussed so far:
Figure 2: Significant Effects (Standardised Coefficients) in OLS Models of Satisfaction
with Democracy
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Source: BES 2005 (Pre-election face-to-face survey).
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In politics it is strikingly exemplified. The competition for votes between the Republican
and Democratic parties does not lead to a clear drawing of issues, an adoption of two
strongly contrasted positions between which the voter may choose. Instead, each party strives
to make its platform as much like the other’s as possible. Any radical departure would lose
many votes, even though it might lead to stronger commendation of the party by some who
would vote for it anyhow. Each candidate ‘pussyfoots’, replies ambiguously to questions,
refuses to take a definite stand in any controversy for fear of losing votes. Real differences,
if they ever exist, fade gradually with time though the issues may be as important as ever
(Hotelling, 1929, pp. 54–5).
The central message of our research is that Hotelling’s evident exasperation is shared by
at least some voters. Ideological convergence beyond a certain point – and, in Britain at
least, that point was passed long ago – comes at a cost in terms of citizens’ satisfaction with
electoral democracy.This is because it leaves the party system as a whole less representative
of the ideological diversity within the electorate as a whole.Voters do not appear to prize
ideological diversity for its own sake. Satisfaction with democracy was not enhanced by a
perception that the two major parties were ideologically distinct (perhaps because the
position of a less preferred party is thought irrelevant, or perhaps because the benefits of
choice are cancelled out by the risk of an ideologically distant party gaining power).The
reason that convergence erodes satisfaction is that it leaves voters, on average, further from
the nearest major contender for office.
Two points are worth emphasising about our findings. First, satisfaction is not a spec-
ifically electoral dependent variable. Ideological proximity, and the resulting feeling
of being represented, generates a sense of system support. Second, the results were stri-
kingly consistent across the tax–spend and left–right analyses. Both scales have merits
as a basis for calculating representational distances. Left–right ideology has the advantage
of generality, offering a broader basis for representation than a specific issue like taxes
and spending. However, the policy scale has the advantage of concreteness. Few voters
think readily in abstract ideological terms and one consequence is that left–right self-
placements show less dispersion than the tax–spend and other policy scales, with confused
respondents flocking to the midpoint. Yet despite these substantive and distributional
differences, both measures show the same association between voter–party distance and
dissatisfaction.
The fact that voters only prize ideological diversity in so far as it provides them with a
proximate party does not mean that such diversity is unimportant. Given the prevailing
dispersion in the electorate, the individual-level representativeness that we have shown to
generate satisfaction can only be accomplished through a more ideologically diverse party
system.This conclusion emerges from viewing the two parts of our analysis in conjunction.
The regression models inTable 2 show that voters more distant from the nearest major party
are less satisfied. And the longitudinal analysis in Table 1 shows that average distance from
the nearest major party is a function of the ideological distance between those parties.
While, before 1997, convergence in a hitherto over-differentiated party system increased
mean proximity and hence representativeness of the party system, the further convergence
since then has put ever more distance between many voters and their nearest contender for
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government.We can reasonably infer that the vote-seeking strategies of British parties have
contributed to dissatisfaction with democracy.
Our results clash with Ezrow and Xezonakis’ (2011) aggregate-level finding that, across
European party systems, an increase in dispersion was greeted with declining satisfaction.
One possible reason for the clashing results is that ours is specific to ideologically conver-
gent two-party systems. Perhaps multiparty systems, especially under proportional repre-
sentation, continue to exhibit the kind of monopolistic competition that we also found for
Britain in the pre-New Labour era, and which can actually lead to over-differentiation. In
such instances, convergence (up to a point) actually helps by reducing the mean distance
from voters to their nearest party, and thus improving the representativeness of the party
system.Testing this conjecture means replicating our individual-level analysis across coun-
tries (and ideally also across time). Comparative analysis would also allow us to distinguish
distance to the nearest major party from distance to the nearest parliamentary party.With
so few parties in Britain (and the only other serious player in Westminster elections falling
ideologically in between the two major parties), there was no scope to identify whether
voters are satisfied simply by having their views represented in parliament or whether they
need at least the prospect of having those views represented in government.
Another distinction necessarily elided in this article is between spatial and social rep-
resentation. The evidence that voters actually think in spatial terms is scanty and it
could be that our ideological distances are a clumsy proxy for what many voters see as
the real representational deficit, namely the lack of a party serving the interests of ‘people
like them’. Indeed, the term ‘catch-all parties’ was coined to describe social rather than
spatial convergence, and the former – parties moving beyond their socially segmented
electorates to appeal across such divisions – is just as close an analogy to the shift
from monopolistic competition to competition for monopoly. Addressing these ideas
empirically would require new data with different kinds of measures of representational
distance.
Meanwhile, our results carry normative implications for competition in the depolarised
British party system.The valence or ‘performance politics’ model, which has become the
dominant framework for understanding voting behaviour and party competition (Clarke
et al., 2004;2009;Green, 2007), is an electoral version of vertical differentiation as described
above. Parties compete only in terms of their capacity to deliver common goals. Moreover,
just as vertical differentiation offers less choice than horizontal differentiation unless
consumers’ tastes are assumed to be identical, so valence competition offers less choice
unless all voters are assumed to share the same policy preferences.As we have seen, the latter
assumption is untenable. There has been some convergence in the electorate but there
remains ideological diversity. Voters are not only interested in competence and delivery,
even if the structure of party competition offers them little other basis for choice. To
pursue Hotelling’s example: some voters continue to like their cider a good deal sweeter
than others do but everyone has to make do with a medium-sweet option while the
parties compete only on consensual priorities like freshness.
So it is not surprising that at least some voters are dissatisfied with valence-based party
competition. It also suggests limits on the capacity of valence competition to restore and
strengthen satisfaction with democracy. As Clarke et al. (2009, p. 19) assert:
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If there is an incipient ‘crisis of political engagement’ in contemporary Britain, then
its solution lies largely in the hands of the parties and in the politicians themselves. By
performing – by finding solutions to critical policy problems – they not only help themselves
as vote-seeking, would-be officeholders; they also contribute to the health of British
democracy.
The powerful effects of economic and other performance evaluations in their models of
democratic satisfaction provide strong backing for this assertion.Yet the picture is incom-
plete. Some voters do not simply want ‘solutions’; they want a certain type of solution that
is consistent with their values and preferences. Even if performance is consistently good,
those voters will remain at least somewhat disgruntled at the lack of a party that represents
those preferences.And since voters tend on the whole to regard performance as uninspir-
ing, their need for that sense of being represented is redoubled.
Appendix
Table A1: Tax–Spend Distance Effects from Ordered Logit Models of Democratic
Satisfaction: By Party Identification
All
Party identification
Con Lab Other None
Left–
right
Distance to
nearest
major party
-0.13*** (0.04) -0.09 (0.07) -0.10* (0.06) -0.32*** (0.07) -0.05 (0.08)
Distance
Lab–Con
0.02 (0.03) -0.00 (0.05) -0.03 (0.05) -0.08 (0.06) 0.11* (0.06)
(Distance
Lab–Con)2
0.00 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) -0.00 (0.01) 0.01 (0.02)
Cox/Snell R2 0.24 0.17 0.21 0.25 0.26
N 2,101 552 768 444 337
Tax–
spend
Distance to
nearest
major party
-0.11*** (0.03) -0.07 (0.06) -0.12** (0.05) -0.23*** (0.06) -0.04 (0.06)
Distance
Lab–Con
-0.04 (0.03) -0.03 (0.05) 0.04 (0.05) -0.08 (0.06) -0.11* (0.06)
(Distance
Lab–Con)2
0.02** (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.04** (0.02) -0.02 (0.03)
Cox/Snell R2 0.24 0.19 0.21 0.22 0.27
N 2,811 726 1,009 506 570
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
Source: BES 2005 (pre-election face-to-face survey).
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Table A2: OLS Regression Models of Democratic Satisfaction
Left–right distances Tax–spend distances
B s.e. Beta B s.e. Beta
Distance to nearest party -0.05*** 0.01 -0.08 -0.04*** 0.01 -0.08
Perceived Lab–Con
distance
0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.03
(Perceived Lab–Con
distance)2
-0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.01** 0.00 0.04
Conservative ID 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.02
Labour ID 0.14*** 0.04 0.09 0.13*** 0.04 0.09
Other party ID -0.03 0.05 -0.02 -0.02 0.04 -0.01
Trust Westminster
parliament
0.07*** 0.01 0.23 0.07*** 0.01 0.22
Trust politicians generally 0.03*** 0.01 0.09 0.02*** 0.01 0.07
Trust local MP to work
hard
0.07*** 0.02 0.09 0.06*** 0.01 0.08
Attention to politics -0.02*** 0.01 -0.07 -0.01* 0.01 -0.03
Influence on politics 0.03*** 0.01 0.09 0.03*** 0.01 0.08
Retrospective economic
evaluations
0.10*** 0.02 0.13 0.12*** 0.01 0.15
Social trust 0.05*** 0.01 0.12 0.04*** 0.01 0.12
Age 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01
Female -0.01 0.03 -0.00 -0.01 0.02 -0.01
Ethnic minority -0.06 0.05 -0.02 -0.02 0.05 -0.01
Terminal education age -0.02** 0.01 -0.04 -0.02* 0.01 -0.04
(Constant) 1.47*** 0.10 1.46*** 0.09
R2 (adj.) 0.25 0.24
N 2,101 2,811
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
Source: BES 2005 (pre-election face-to-face survey).
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Notes
An earlier version of this research was presented at the Elections, Public Opinion and Parties conference in Exeter, September 2011.
We thank participants in that panel for their comments and suggestions.We are also grateful to Michael Laver, Lawrence Ezrow,Marcel
van Egmond and three anonymous reviewers for discussions and contributions which have greatly improved the article.
1 For our purposes, there are only two ‘major’ parties: Labour and the Conservatives.This is partly because they are the leading
contenders for government. At least until the closing stages of the 2010 general election campaign, the Liberal Democrats were
not widely or plausibly seen as candidates for office.The other reason for considering only the two largest parties is that we are
concerned with ideological dispersion and the Liberal Democrats (and their predecessor parties) have not contributed in this
respect, being generally seen by voters as occupying an intermediate position.
2 Blais and Bodet (2006, p. 1243, emphasis added) suggest that, in PR systems,‘parties are less centrist, and this increases the overall
distance between voters and parties’. But their measure of distance is between voters and the governing party or parties, and so their
findings are not at odds with those of Golder and Stramski (2010).
3 These centrifugal pressures are reflected in the fact that, in the competitive environment simulated by Laver and Sergenti (2012),
aggregators also have lower survival chances than hunters.
4 This dyadic perspective is different from the conventional approach to party–voter congruence. In the latter, the party is the unit of
analysis. Its position is given, and representation is measured as the average ideological proximity of the voters it attracts. Since our
units of analysis are citizens, we take their positions as given and then measure representation as the distance from the nearest party.
5 The effect is non-monotonic in that extra choices beyond a certain point cause cognitive overload and reduce satisfaction. But
that turning point usually arrives at a large (double-digit) number of choices (Scheibehenne et al., 2010), many more than are
available in settled party systems.
6 The proportion of respondents thus omitted from the analyses varies across the different election years but is typically in the range
of 10–15 per cent.This hefty proportion confirms that a significant minority of voters struggle to conceive of politics in ideological
terms, even when prompted to do so by survey questions (see Converse, 1964). However, although it means a loss of cases, this
non-response does not disrupt our main purpose which is to assess whether, among those who can locate themselves and the
parties, voter–party distances have increased and in a way that erodes satisfaction with democracy.
7 This rules out aggregate-level modelling of satisfaction with democracy over time. In any event, there are too few time points for
the kind of model estimated by Ezrow and Xezonakis (2011) to test whether characteristics of the party system have an
independent effect on the level of democratic satisfaction.
8 This persistent finding has met with scepticism, particularly after the 1992 election in which the rejection of Labour seemed to
belie reported public willingness to pay more tax. However, since we are concerned with differences among parties and voters in
scale placements, it is not a problem if the mean voter’s position is biased to the left.
9 In reality, of course, parties do not split symmetrically around the mean or median voter.Typically, one party (and by no means
always the election winner) is closer to the mean voter.The fact that the ideological ‘centre of gravity’ of a party system may fall
at a distance from the average voter constitutes another potential shortfall in representation.However, since we are concerned with
the dispersion rather than the central tendency of party positions, it makes sense to hold the latter constant by placing the parties
with respect to the mean voter placement rather than the scale midpoint of 5. For the same reason,we do not calculate actual mean
distances between voters and their nearest major party for each election.That distance is also a function of the ideological centre
of gravity of the party system,whereas we need to calculate the effect of dispersion on distances, holding central tendency constant.
10 The large BES samples mean that the standard errors around these perceived distances are quite tight. So any noticeable difference
between the perceived gap between the parties, and the optimal gap given voters’ locations, is statistically significant – very clearly
so in the case of the most recent elections.This provides formal confirmation of H1: the perceived gap has indeed gone from
significantly wider (1987) to being significantly narrower (since 2001) than the optimal gap.
11 The bimodal aspect of the distribution is typical for such scales where, in addition to the ‘true’ central tendency of opinions, there
is usually a pronounced spike at the midpoint.This could reflect a genuine preference for the status quo; it could equally reflect
satisficing, namely the search for a pat response that avoids the need for deeper thinking about the question (Krosnick, 1991;
Zigerell, 2011).
12 Income is left out of the model because there are so many missing values that including it would mean an unacceptable reduction
in sample size. In any case, its effect was non-significant when included.
13 We can confirm the first part of this conjecture: among Liberal Democrat supporters, there was only a negative linear effect of
perceived Labour–Conservative distance and no quadratic effect. Unfortunately, the data set includes too few supporters of the
other smaller parties to provide an adequate sample for estimating this multivariate model.
14 The model compares well in terms of pseudo-R2 with others in the literature (e.g. Clarke et al., 2004, p. 306).
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